Chad Attacks Emphasize Regional Dynamics of Nigeria's Insurgency

During a visit to Chad on June 4th, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari emphasized that when it comes to security, Chad and Nigeria are "intricately linked". With last week's attack on N'Djamena, the regional dynamics of the Boko Haram insurgency have been brought into graphic relief. While Boko Haram has not claimed responsibility for the violence, the group will definitely be where Chad's embattled leadership targets its outrage – with the assistance of international security partners, including the United States.

Although Chad has been assertively deploying troops to fight Boko Haram in Cameroon and Nigeria since the beginning of 2015, last week's deadly attacks on buildings affiliated with the police and intelligence services marked the first time that violent retaliation by Boko Haram forces reached Chad's capital.

The dual attacks on police compounds in N'Djamena are likely to signal an escalation in what most observers would agree is an already regionalized conflict. The question is: how will this escalate?

The same proximity to northern Nigeria that has made Chad such a compelling launch site for counterinsurgency operations also puts it at risk for attack. It is worth noting that Maiduguri, the site of the Baga market suicide bombings earlier this year and an essential Boko Haram hotspot, is just a four-hour drive (or several days on foot) away from the police buildings in N'Djamena that were attacked on Monday. And the 8,700 troops of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), composed of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, and Cameroon, and which is designed to break the insurgency, will also be sharing this advantageous yet potentially lethal proximity. Illustrating the risk, in January, Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, outlined his intent to attack Chad for its role in repelling his forces. "Idriss Déby, you are not spared," he told Chad's long-time president in a recorded clip.

The contributions that Chad's Armée National Tchadienne (ANT) has made to push back against Boko Haram this year have been critical. On the crest of a wave of oil money, Chad's fighting force has become a well-supplied and fiercely capable force against Boko Haram. Celeste Hicks, a freelance journalist from the UK and focusing on the Sahel, draws on estimates from the International Money Fund that assert around $4 billion USD in revenue generated since Chad began producing oil in 2003 has been targeted towards the defense sector.

Consequently, President Idriss Déby's rigid and potentially brittle authoritarianism has not stopped Chad from becoming a preferential partner in the fight against violent extremism in the region. As Chad decides how to move forward after Monday's attacks, it is likely to do so with many international military personnel watching closely.

Alongside the still-in-formation MNJTF, French forces have a significant presence in Chad, with 3,000 troops stationed around the capital as part of the Sahel-focused Operation Barkhane.

The central African nation also happens to be in a part of the world where the United States is extremely anxious to project power. Specifically, the US is interested in countering violent extremism without putting "boots on the ground".

As a result, the U.S. has also stepped up its relations with Chad in recent years. In the midst of international frustration with Nigeria's limited search for the Chibok girls, the U.S. supported the launch of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance efforts into Nigeria from within Chad's borders. In March of this year, Chad even hosted (the largest ever) Operation Flintlock, a joint training exercise designed to strengthen intra-operability between African militaries and western partners. General David Rodriguez, who heads the United States Military Command for Africa, emphasized that Chad's ANT demonstrated " a level of proficiency exhibited only by an extremely professional, capable military" because they were able to participate in joint training exercises while "actively engaged in combat against Boko Haram" at the same time.

Although Chad's security forces have successfully projected an image of themselves as key contributors to regional security, as Celeste Hicks points out, "Up until 2008, Chad's national army, the ANT, had been an unreliable fighting force, starved of resources and beset with problems of corruption and poorly paid soldiers whose loyalty was questionable." That changed radically with Chad's new status as an oil producer. For the past decade, President Déby's has consistently funded the "regularization of the situation of many fighters within the ANT [often through] buying their loyalty."

Yet Déby's authoritarian leadership has also made him countless enemies within his own country. When the attack took place on Monday, some were quick to point out that symbols of the Chadian state could be targets for long-simmering internal opposition, rather than neighboring extremists. In the first days after the violence, Chad's leadership is being anything but accommodating towards its majority Muslim population. Full-faced veils have been banned and the ANT and the police have been "ordered to seize and burn all full-face veils" being sold in public spaces.

The U.S. has to figure out how to balance the fact that while Boko Haram must be stopped, a security partnership with Chad is not a straightforward one. Idriss Déby has been in power longer than most of today's college seniors have been alive. No American could imagine waking up tomorrow to find George H W Bush had remained in the White House since his election in 1989, but Chadians have lived this reality for more than two decades.

While U.S. observers are vocally opposed to Pierre Nkurunziza advancing for a third term in Burundi, there is very limited attention on Idriss Déby's presidential term, which has already lasted close to a quarter century. And without much attention, Déby has already legislated into possibility a loophole that would allow him to run for office until at least 2022.

The U.S. has a clear interest in countering Boko Haram's violent extremism, and there is no doubt that the U.S. security community must support efforts to address the Boko Haram threat. But the decision makers of the U.S. security community also have an obligation to step carefully, for as Chad's embattled leadership takes on Boko Haram they are likely to keep narrowing the space for domestic opposition as well.

The Wilson Center Africa Program will be having an event on Boko Haram this week. For more information please click here.