Ethiopian Troops to Join AMISOM Mission: Implications for Somalia's Security

For the last year, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somalia National Army (SNA) and allied forces were unable to expand their territorial control due to logistical and personnel deficit, and military stalemate[i]. Despite the presence of these forces, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist group Al-Shaba'ab still controls a significant part of south central Somalia. AMISOM repeatedly reported its lack of capabilities[ii] with regard to helicopters, uniformed personnel and other logistics[iii]. In response to these requests, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2124/2013 on November 12, 2013 to increase the uniformed personnel from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126, as well as to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM with an extension for two years as part of exit strategy from a request of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Subsequent to the UNSC resolution and request from the SFG, the Ethiopian government has decided to join AMISOM.  This paper discusses whether the addition of Ethiopian troops to AMISOM has any implication on the security of Somalia and AMISOM capabilities.

Why Ethiopia said 'Yes' to AMISOM mission

Since 2012, Ethiopia has intervened in Somalia to defend its national security from terrorist groups, both in terms of troops and financial support.  Due to the inability of AMISOM and the SNA to expand their territories and oust Al-Shaba'ab from its current controls, the Ethiopian government decided to join AMISOM.  Its troops operate in sector three and four of AMISOM. The Ethiopian Prime Minister confirmed the decision of his government to join AMISON on the request of SFG and its people after scrutinizing the situation by its national security council. According to the Ethiopian Premier Haile Mariam Desalegn in his exclusive interview with the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency [ARTA], Ethiopia decided to join AMISOM for three reasons. First was to strengthen AMISOM so as to oust Al-Shaba'ab from the rural areas of Somalia through increasing the number of uniformed personnel and logistical capabilities of AMISOM. Second, it is financially viable for Ethiopia to contribute personnel and logistical support. For lower-income countries like Ethiopia, it is difficult to sustain military operations in third-party countries with their own financing. As a result, joining AMISOM gives relief to Ethiopia in terms of the financial burden. Third, a peaceful situation in Somalia benefits not only the Somalia people, but also Ethiopia as a neighbor country because of its spillover effect.

Potential Costs and Benefits to the Security Situation

It is obvious that adding Ethiopian troops to the AMISOM mission will enhance its capabilities, and the problem of coordination among current Ethiopian troops who are there independent of the mission and AMISOM may also be improved. However, there is concern that the number of Ethiopian troops to be deployed under the UN resolution may not constitute an actual increase in the number of troops fighting Al-Shaba'ab on the ground. Some local media outlets have indicated that about eight thousand Ethiopian troops, not associated with the AMISOM mission, are currently deployed to Somalia – although this has not been confirmed by the Ethiopian government. The UNSC resolution allows for an increase of only four thousand uniformed personnel, which may actually result in a reduction in the number of Ethiopian military personnel in operation throughout Somalia.

If Ethiopia joins AMISOM and withdraws its forces to the number of authorized troops or reallocates them to areas that fall within the mission parameters, a security vacuum may be created in the areas under the current control of Ethiopian forces.  Consequently, this might provide an opportunity for Al-Shaba'ab to recover the areas lost unless another mechanism is devised.  Al Shaba'ab has influence over several groups, such as the Galgala rebel group operating in Puntland. It also continues to attack not only civilian, but also military bases of AMISOM and SNA.  Al Shaba'ab conducts an average of two attacks per week in Somalia, where the SFG and AMISOM control. It extends attacks and attempts to Kenya and Ethiopia.

Conclusion

Hence, the joining of Ethiopia troops to AMISOM, if it is not supported by any other means, will not result an increase of troops in the ground to oust Al-Shaba'ab from rural areas, which is the purpose of the United Nations Security Council's resolution. Ethiopia should not sacrifice beyond this by redeploying its troops financed by the Ethiopian economy under the AMISOM mission.  The security of Somalia may be deteriorated due to inability to consolidate the existing gains and proceeding forward to liberate other areas from Al-shaba'ab that needs deployment of additional troops on the ground.  Consequently, the international community, especially the United Nations and African Union, should focus on building the SNA capability in both qualitatively and quantitatively to cover Somalia territories.

Daniel Kebede is a Southern Voices Network African Research Scholar for The Wilson Center's Africa Program. He is currently working on his PhD at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.

Photo Credit: United Nations via Flickr. (License NC-ND-2.0)

Notes:

[i] David H. Shinn 19 October 2013 Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOM At a Conference on "Somalia: Post-transition Plight and Progress" Organized by the Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.