Kenyan-Somali Cooperation Needed for a Post al-Shabaab Future

The Criminalization of Somalis in Kenya

The latest spate of Kenya's high-handed treatment of Kenyan-Somalis, following spiraling insecurity, could potentially harm the country's long-term efforts to eliminate terrorism and produce unintended consequences.  The attack on the Likoni church in Mombasa recently and the subsequent blast in Eastleigh – a Nairobi suburb predominantly occupied by the Kenyan- Somalis – are grim reminders of Kenya's precarious security situation since sending troops into Somalia in October 2011 in the pursuit of al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda-affiliated organizations.

The Kenyan police's sweeping crackdown and the mass round-up and detention of the Somali community in Eastleigh demonstrates the treatment of the Somali community as inferior. This will further deteriorate the sore relationship between Kenyan-Somalis and the state and erode the community's trust in the battle against al-Shabaab.

Demonization of Kenyan-Somalis and al-Shabaab

The relations between various faiths in Kenya have been amicable since its independence. But the recent wave of attacks on churches ostensibly carried out by the al-Shabaab factions in Kenya and the subsequent governmental overreaction targeting Muslim communities, especially Somalis, could erode the inter-faith harmony in the country.  For al-Shabaab, just like al-Qaeda, there is logic to targeting places of worship; they intend to drive a wedge between religious bodies and ignite conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Al Qaeda implemented this strategy in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Mali.

At the national level, however, Kenya is playing into al-Shabaab's hands. The vilification of the Somalis supports and reinforces their goals.  In 2012, one year after intervening in Somalia, Kenya passed an anti-terrorism bill. The law enforcement authority has used the bill as justification for discriminating against any community that it does not entirely trust – especially Kenyan-Somalis. While ethnic marginalization of Somalis is unsurprising, the new law provides a new degree of legitimacy for it, stimulating terrorists to use it as a rallying message.

The Cabinet Secretary in charge of Internal Security, Joseph Ole Lenku, issued a directive that all Somali refugees outside the camps in the northeast region of the country must return to their homes. He blamed the refugees for the current insecurity in Kenya.  While the directive implicitly labels all Somali refugees as potential terrorists, this is also a gross misunderstanding of al-Shabaab's transitional nature – the group's membership is no longer exclusively Somalis, but now also includes Kenyans and other East African nationalities.

Moreover, throughout the past few months, a leading Kenyan columnist made the case for Somalia to be annexed by Kenya, while the editor of a leading national publication called all Somalis 'terrorists.' Such blatant demonization of Somalis feeds into an already tenuous history.

Historical context

Historically, the relations between Kenya and the Kenyan-Somalis have been fraught. This predates Kenya's independence in 1963. During the Colonial period, the British considered the Northern Kenya, where Kenyan-Somalis reside, as a buffer frontier first against the Menelik in Ethiopia, and latter against the Italians, who briefly occupied Ethiopia. As such, the British invested little in the region, utilizing it more as a wildlife hunting zone.

In the aftermath of colonialism, the newly independent Kenya continued to treat the northern part of the country the same way as the British, if not worse. The Kenyan-Somali attempt to join Somalia to fulfill the expansionist plan of the time – conjoining Somalia, Djibouti, the Ogaden of Ethiopia, and the northeastern province of Kenya to comprise one large state called Soomaaliweyn - was brutally suppressed. Since then, the interaction between the state and northern Kenya has been mediated through brute force and mutual suspicion, and mainly viewed as a matter of security. Having been subjugated to military massacres and endemic human rights violations, the northern region of Kenya also receives very limited funds from the government for the economic activities of the pastoralists, which are perceived as obsolete practices.

The relationship between Kenya and Somalia is further complicated by their opposing ideas concerning a shared common security problem, despite mutual economic and security interests. Decades of marginalization haven't dampened the Kenyan-Somalis' entrepreneurial acumen. Kenya can leverage this spirit by lending advisory support to the nascent Somali government's institutions. Additionally, Kenya's boundary-less market necessitates a stable environment in which to grow, requiring security and safety. Somalia's stability is in Kenya's economic interest.

Post al-Shabaab Prospects

Kenya-Somalia cooperation should be guided by a common post-al-Shabaab vision. The group's capacity has been significantly diminished, but they have yet to be eliminated. A combination of African troops under AMISOM and the Somali National Army has driven the group out of many key regions and districts it formerly controlled. For first time, the Somali government controls more territory than al-Shabaab, albeit weakly.

This unified momentum against the group could potentially turn the tide against al-Shabaab and present an opportunity for peacebuilding and stability in Somalia. That is not to suggest that al-Shabaab does not pose any threat; on the contrary, the group remains very dangerous and diffuse, with functioning units and sympathizers in both Kenya and Somalia.

The heart of their franchised strategy revolves around hit-and-run tactics – a modern guerilla form of warfare making them more lethal than when they simply controlled territory. Due to domestic backlash, al-Shabaab has diffused, infiltrating the porous border between Kenya and Somalia.

The degrading of the group's power, however, presents a window of opportunity. For instance, Turkey, the UK, and Norway have undertaken the task of rebuilding much-needed infrastructure. Several Kenyan construction companies have begun operating in Somalia, providing employment opportunities for both Kenyan and Somali workers.

As opposed to reliance upon military force, the key to defeating al–Shabaab in the long-term lies in development and employment. To prevent the group's resurgence, Kenya and Somalia must capture this window of opportunity by building a new integrated and interagency security partnership to support the young Somali national government security institutions.

Kenya, as one of the troop-contributing countries to AMISOM, should pivot towards a cooperative post-al-Shabaab future. Fostering security cooperation by eliminating al-Shabaab will deliver an enormous peace dividend that benefits not only Kenya and Somalia, but also the entire region.

Abdihakim Ainte is Managing Director at Transitional Advisory, an international consulting firm. He tweets @Abdikhakim

Abdullahi Boru Halakhe is Horn of Africa Analyst. He tweets @QulshTM

Photo Credit: See Li Flickr