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Nigeria Beyond the Elections

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Nigeria is scheduled to hold national elections on March 28 and state elections on April 11. The elections have occasioned intense competition and equally intense uncertainty. Originally scheduled for February 14 and 28, the vote was postponed due to security forces' concerns about the northeast, where the violent group Boko Haram ("Western education is forbidden by Islam") primarily operates. Some Nigerians expect another postponement, an outright cancellation of the elections, or the firing of Independent National Electoral Commission Chairman Attahiru Jega, who resisted the security forces' call for a delay. Nigerian authorities face domestic and international pressure not to move the calendar again, but further changes are possible.

Even after the elections, Nigeria will still face deep-rooted problems, including corruption, unemployment, and insecurity. It matters who wins – but only to an extent. Long-term change will depend on whether the political, business, and military elite can commit to more responsive governance and more equitable allocation of resources, and whether voters and citizens can hold elites accountable.

Core Problems

Corruption, unemployment, and insecurity are interrelated. Many Nigerians identify corruption as their country's core problem. Much corruption involves oil. Nigeria is Africa's largest producer, generating about two million barrels per day, but much oil and oil wealth is stolen. Recent scandals include a former Central Bank governor's 2013 allegation that the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation could not account for nearly $50 billion. This case and others have been clouded by counter-accusations, investigations, and conspiracy theories, but most accounts agree that Nigeria loses billions to corruption each year.

Corruption is not limited to oil. The National Police Force has been accused of systemically harassing drivers and detainees. Many Nigerians experience corruption not just as the theft of public monies but also as predation by authority figures with whom they interact directly.

Corruption helps drive inequality. Over 60% of Nigerians live on less than $1 a day, despite Nigeria having Africa's largest gross domestic product (nearly $510 billion). Unemployment figures are disputed, but a 2013 estimate puts unemployment at 22% and youth unemployment at 38%. As some Nigerians enrich themselves, and as a middle class grows in parts of the country, millions of Nigerians still have no livelihood.

Many commentators have made a misleading equation between corruption, poverty, and Boko Haram, as though economic desperation and regional disparities inevitably create violent groups. Boko Haram is the product of numerous factors, of which poverty is only one. Causes aside, however, corruption has unquestionably hampered the fight against Boko Haram. Security forces' predations weaken civilians' trust in government. Corruption within the security forces prevents pay and supplies from reaching the front lines. Witness the complaints of soldiers who fired on their commander's car in May 2014: they blamed senior officers for under-equipping their comrades who had just been fatally ambushed by Boko Haram. All of these problems will confront Nigeria's next president.

Core Issues and the Presidential Campaign

In the presidential race, incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, who took office in 2010, faces former military ruler General Muhammadu Buhari, the runner-up in Nigeria's last three presidential elections. Much international coverage has portrayed their rivalry in regional terms – Jonathan hails from the south, Buhari from the north, and Jonathan's tenure disrupts an agreement within the ruling party to rotate power between the south and the north. International media coverage has also connected Buhari's widening popularity to Jonathan's seeming inability to defeat Boko Haram.

This coverage overlooks other elements of Buhari's appeal, especially his image as an anti-corruption fighter. Buhari's allies have advanced a sophisticated economic agenda. Unlike in previous elections, Buhari now has the backing of a truly national coalition, many of whose leaders hail from the prosperous southwest. The campaign's economic vision includes attention to poverty, which the campaign hopes to address through massive government investment in infrastructure and job creation. Buhari's supporters promise that he would crack down on both Boko Haram and corruption, all while reorienting the economy toward ordinary citizens.

Jonathan contends that he is already transforming the economy. The president's allies emphasize numbers: Nigeria's emergence as Africa's largest economy, increases in foreign direct investment, new road and rail construction, and so forth. The campaign argues that the economy is on a positive trajectory and that Jonathan is already implementing the infrastructural projects Buhari advocates. One challenge for the presidency, however, is the global drop in oil prices, which hurts Nigeria's economy. Voters will head to the polls amid economic pain.

In the security arena, it is contentious to say where security imperatives end and the administration's political incentives begin. Boko Haram has unquestionably disrupted governance in the northeast. Yet the crisis is a political battleground as well. In his statement on the electoral postponement, the Independent National Electoral Commission chairman suggested that a delay was unnecessary. The public intervention of National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki in electoral issues made the delay seem political – a chance for the administration to attempt a last-minute refutation of the persistent charge that it has ignored Boko Haram. Indeed, after the postponement, the security forces launched an offensive, dislodging Boko Haram (or claiming to dislodge it) from areas it had controlled for months. The military's short-term successes could sway some voters back to Jonathan's camp.

Beyond the Elections

Whether Jonathan or Buhari wins, Nigeria's challenges cannot be overcome without broad change. The presidency cannot make this change by itself. In the economic sphere, a top-down crackdown on corruption could have a dramatic effect – but would not necessarily eliminate street-level corruption by police officers, university admissions officers, or low-level functionaries. A crackdown could also antagonize the very elites a president would need in order to pass and enact a legislative agenda. Without addressing corruption, however, it will be difficult to build an economy that works for all Nigerians, especially if low oil prices continue. A reformist president would need help.

In the security realm, it should be possible to deprive Boko Haram of the territory it has held since 2014, especially with the military help Nigeria is receiving (albeit with mixed feelings) from its neighbors. It will be more difficult to eliminate Boko Haram altogether. The sect has proven enduringly adaptable. It could continue bombing Nigerian cities and neighboring countries, and massacring villagers, for some time to come. Ending the crisis will require years of effort to restore civilians' trust in government, protect Muslim leaders who denounce the group's ideology, revitalize northern Nigeria's economy, and change how security forces conduct counterterrorism.

Far-reaching change in Nigeria will require more than a new or a reinvigorated president. Particularly important will be the fate of the emerging two-party system: if the defeated party maintains cohesion, that trend could institutionalize electoral competition and increase accountability for elites. The new class of state governors, many of whom will be newcomers, will also be important. Finally, Nigerian citizens will play a major role. Voters could find their voices drowned out by fraud and backroom deals in this election, or they could play the decisive role in selecting the next president. In either case, their behavior after the election will be the most powerful force in determining whether the 2015-2019 cycle will see new approaches to Nigeria's core problems, or a further entrenchment of the status quo.

Alex Thurston is a visiting Assistant Professor at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Photo courtesy of dorena-wm via Flickr Commons

About the Author

Alex Thurston


Africa Program

The Africa Program works to address the most critical issues facing Africa and US-Africa relations, build mutually beneficial US-Africa relations, and enhance knowledge and understanding about Africa in the United States. The Program achieves its mission through in-depth research and analyses, public discussion, working groups, and briefings that bring together policymakers, practitioners, and subject matter experts to analyze and offer practical options for tackling key challenges in Africa and in US-Africa relations.    Read more