The Implications of Burkina Faso’s Political Transition

The surprise ousting of Blaise Compaore in October 2014 is a testament to the power of political resistance and the democratic will. However, the coup represents only the early stages of a political transition whose outcomes depend largely on the actions of Burkina Faso's military. These events also raise serious questions about the role of international actors in domestic political transitions, particularly where economic or security interests are involved.

"I have agreed to hand in my resignation from the Presidency of Burkina Faso. I have decided  to leave power, faced with the tragedy that has affected my country."

With these 136 characters, Blaise Compaore's 27-year rule of Burkina Faso came to an abrupt end on October 31, 2014 in a distinctly 21st century format. Days earlier, popular protests erupted over his attempts to alter the country's constitution to allow him to seek an additional term. Yet while his resignation came quickly, the seeds of political transition have been growing for years, with popular protests in 2011, 2013, and early 2014 against a host of issues, including rising costs of living and a proposal to establish a senate. Following a brief period of confusion over the country's transitional leadership, which opposition leader Zéphirin Diabré termed "a coup within an uprising," military leader Lt. Col. Isaac Zida was appointed prime minister. Former Foreign Minister Michel Kafando was sworn in as interim president, presiding over a 26-member transitional government tasked with guiding the country toward elections.

Implications for Burkina Faso

The surprise ousting of Compaore is a testament to the power of political resistance, and has rightly been celebrated as an expression of the democratic will. However, this represents only the early stages of a political transition whose outcomes depend largely on the actions of the military. As Valerie Arnould has analyzed, internal rivalries within the military may determine success of the transition, as will the ability of the heretofore-fragmented opposition to coalesce into viable political alternatives. Nor is the historical record comforting: of 16 "democratic coups" from 1900 to 2006, only 40% culminated in democracy, while 50% ushered in significant political violence. Based on this research, Jonathan Pinckney concludes, "a negotiated political transition with a mobilized civil society keeping the old guard accountable and a rapid move to democratic elections…is the country's best chance for a long-term positive outcome."

Implications for African Countries

The hopeful implication of Compaore's ousting for other African nations is to serve as a stark warning for sitting rulers to undertake political liberalization and to respect term limits, where they exist. If Burkina Faso and the Arab Spring countries represent the dangers of sustained repression for autocrats' survival, China and more recently Myanmar (Burma) represent potential roadmaps for cautious adjustments in political freedoms.

Yet whether this message will be heeded remains to be seen. As Pierre Englebert has observed, the presidents of eight African countries (Benin, Burundi, the Congo Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) will approach constitutional term limits over the next three years. Several of them "appear to be either toying with the idea of extending their ride or [are] already hard at work doing so." Likewise, just this week Zimbabwe's ruling ZANU-PF party endorsed 90-year-old President Robert Mugabe as its 2018 presidential candidate. Given the complex political calculus involved in attempts to retain power (or entrust it to handpicked successors), it seems likely that Compaore's political demise will have no more than a marginal effect on leaders' decision-making in this regard, particularly for autocratic presidents that tend to isolate themselves from popular opinion, and therefore underestimate the likelihood of domestic protest.

Conversely, the history of successful political protest in Sub-Saharan and North African countries since the early 1990s may inspire local actors to continue to organize against the continent's remaining authoritarian leaders, depending on local conditions. The removal of longstanding dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Burkina Faso may represent a "fourth wave" of democratization that could spread to additional autocracies around the globe. Yet as the number of truly autocratic regimes dwindles with each passing decade, the more relevant question may be whether – and how – transitions like the one in Burkina Faso influence activists in quasi-democratic countries as they push for a more complete consolidation of democratic practices and values. As the Internet becomes more widely accessible throughout the continent, and as popular uprisings continue to be tweeted in real time, the potential for internal movements to resonate across boundaries becomes greater.

Implications for International Actors

For international actors, particularly the African Union (AU) and the United States, the celerity of Compaore's fall has been matched by rapid policy adjustments from the acceptance of an authoritarian ruler to calls for a transition to a "democratic, civilian government." Indeed, the AU threatened sanctions if the military did not quickly hand power to civilians. Yet this seeming reversal is fairly consistent with the general prioritization of stability over democracy for both the AU and the US. The AU has historically been reluctant to criticize undemocratic leaders on the continent, even in the face of un-free and unfair elections, as occurred in Zimbabwe in 2013.

Thus Burkina Faso raises serious foreign policy questions for international actors:

• What role should they play at the onset of popular protests, if any? At what point should international actors lend their voices (and/or material resources) in support of popular movements, or should they refrain from comment on sovereign internal affairs?
• Does taking a position on internal struggles for human rights and democracy help or harm these causes within African countries? Several leaders, including Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Museveni in Uganda, and Kenyatta in Kenya, have successfully portrayed international pressure to respect human rights as the meddling of neocolonial Western powers.
• If autocratic leaders are deposed, what role should international actors play in the transition period, given their own institutional, economic, and/or security interests? For the US, which restricts military assistance in the event of a coup, Burkina has revived the debate following the 2011 removal of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt over the criteria for labeling a transition a "coup," and by extension for withholding military support to vital regional allies. Moreover, donors must remember that democratic consolidation is a process that only begins with founding elections; support must be sustained beyond the end of the first electoral cycle if democracy is truly to take root in Burkina Faso.

In short, Compaore's removal may have been prompted by the demos, but its prospects for sowing democracy in Burkina Faso and beyond remain slim – though non-negligible.

Elizabeth M. Ramey is the Program Associate for the Africa Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Her areas of expertise include democratization and political transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Photo courtesy of Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo via Flickr Commons