Africa Up Close

Libya Citizens along the Libyan-Tunisian border. Photo courtesy of the EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department via Flickr Commons.

World leaders met in Berlin on January 20 to enforce an arms embargo and ceasefire to end the long-running civil war in Libya. A little over two months later, the fighting restarted and intensified as the world’s attention turned to the global fight against coronavirus. In Libya, the Government of National Accord (GNA) announced emergency measures and restrictions in recent weeks, urging citizens to self-isolate to stop the spread of the virus. Meanwhile, residents in Tripoli described the resumption of Khalifa Hafter’s self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive on Tripoli and resulting fear as the “worst since 2011,” with the attackers shelling homes, killing six civilians, and injuring six more.

A Somali man photographed after receiving remittances in Mogadishu, Somalia. Photo courtesy of AMISOM Public Information via Flickr Commons. 

The increasing importance of remittances in global financial flows has elicited calls by experts in the development community for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries to harness the enormous potential of remittances for development. In response to these calls, migration and remittances featured extensively in deliberations on financing implementation of the post-2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Members of al-Shabaab disengage and lay down arms in Somalia. Photo courtesy of  AMISOM via Flickr Commons. 

Globalization and information technology have increased the free movement of people, goods, and information from one territory to another, highlighting the interdependence and interconnectedness of the world’s people and economies. However, the world’s increasing interconnectedness, while generally a boon for society, also benefits criminals. They exploit the blue sky of globalization by increasingly becoming transnational and borderless. One of the manifestations of this is the existence of illicit networks in the Horn of Africa and their linkages to the global criminal world.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during the 11th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union. Credit: Office of the Prime Minister – Ethiopia. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/145325932@N03/45946932812. License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has ruled the country since 1991. Since then, the party has brought commendable economic growth and development including improvements in health, education, electricity, road, telecommunication, and other infrastructures. The same cannot be said on the governance front where the party has demonstrated shortfalls. Over the years, there have been problems associated with human rights abuses, corruption, narrowing of the political space, and unfair distribution of resources and power. In combination, these led to political protests across the country in 2016, 2017, and 2018.

Ebrié port in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

“We went through, just in the last 20 years, this big debt forgiveness for a lot of African countries……now all of a sudden are we going to go through another cycle of that?” These were the remarks of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy at a press conference in Pretoria, South Africa in June 2019. He was, of course, referring to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative that was rolled out by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996 with the noble mission of ensuring that “no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage.” The initiative resulted in billions [i] of dollars in debt relief for the world’s poorest countries—mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Lake Chad Basin humanitarian crisis has caused huge population displacement and left hundreds of thousands of children trapped behind conflict lines. Photo courtesy of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Flickr Commons.

Climate change and its impact on conflict has gained prominent attention in recent global security discourse. Although there is no mono-causal correlation between climate change and conflict, the impact of environmental change on population displacement and regional conflict cannot be underestimated. In the case of the Lake Chad Basin, decades of depletion of the lake due to climate variabilities have largely contributed to fueling insecurity in riparian communities whose livelihoods depend on the lake. In the 1960s, Lake Chad had an area of more than 26,000km. However, it had shrunk to less than 1,500 km by 1997, and dwindled further to 1,350 km by 2014. Agriculture is the mainstay of the local economy of communities across the Lake Chad Basin, but the drastic depletion of the region’s water has affected crop, livestock, and fish production. The impact of this is evident in the rise of environmental migration, population displacement, poverty, and food insecurity within the region’s communities. This has heightened competition over resources such as water, land, and food, resulting in tension, conflict and intercommunal violence. Beyond this, terrorist groups, especially Boko Haram and the Islamic State West African Province, are exploiting these fault lines to recruit vulnerable youth and strengthen their insurgencies in communities across the countries of the Lake Chad Basin.

Downtown Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Photo courtesy of the UK Department for International Development via Flickr Creative Commons.

Ethiopia, with 110 million people, is scheduled to hold a national election in 2020. This follows a pivotal year for Ethiopia, which in 2018 began a political transition marked by new dynamics in the relationship between the government and the people, including the opposition, private sector, and civil society. With the opening of the political space and the return of several opposition political parties and armed groups, the Ethiopian political landscape has witnessed dramatic changes over the last one-and-a-half years.

Voters outside of polling stations during the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 2018 general elections. Photo courtesy of MONUSCO via Flickr Commons.

The “Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue”—the peace process that, in 2003, ended five years of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—identified the legitimacy crisis of the country’s leaders as a key driver of the conflict.[i] Governance legitimacy, which is critical for peace and stability in the fragile DRC, is again in question following the election of December 30, 2018 that many observers saw as deeply flawed and troubling.

Drought leaves dead and dying animals in Northern Kenya. Credit: Oxfam International/Brendan Cox. Source, License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

Since the coming into force of the Paris Agreement in 2016, 50 of Africa’s 54 countries have signed and ratified it, while the remaining four countries have only signed it (Angola, Eritrea, Libya, and South Sudan). Scientifically, it is common knowledge that Africa is the continent most vulnerable to climate change. Non-climatic factors—such as economic strength, access to technology, and social policies—are increasingly influencing African countries’ vulnerability. Moreover, some parts of the continent are exposed to climate change more severely than others, and their level of resilience and adaptability differ. For instance, the probability of drought is higher in Southern Africa, desertification is a threat for West Africa, and East Africa faces more flooding. Despite the heterogeneous consequences, three areas of climate impact are critical for most African countries: water stress, food security, and human health. Addressing these challenges requires a concerted effort at the continental level to streamline and coordinate climate policies and actions, improve weather-related information-gathering, and address chronic funding shortfalls for climate change adaptation.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and U.S. President Donald Trump alongside First Lady Margaret Kenyatta and First Lady Melania Trump during a visit at the White House. Photo courtesy of The White House via Flickr Creative Commons.

Hardly had South African President Cyril Ramaphosa settled into his chairmanship of the African Union (AU) and his compatriot, Wamkele Mene, assumed leadership as Secretary-General (SG) of the fledgling and still largely aspirational African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement before both began to face a baptism by fire in the form of the United States’ and Kenya’s intent to pursue their own bilateral free trade agreement—a formidable challenge to the AfCFTA. How Ramaphosa as 2020 AU Chair and Mene as AfCFTA’s first SG confront this bilateralist challenge to continental trade integration will determine much about the AfCFTA’s future as Africa’s flagship for achieving global economic power status within the world’s fast-shifting geo-economic/strategic landscape.