Africa Up Close

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed alongside military commanders. Photo courtesy of the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia via Wikipedia Commons. 

Ethiopia has undergone some crucial political development since the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition elected a new prime minister. Among other achievements, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ended a 20-year conflict with neighboring Eritrea, freed thousands of political prisoners, unfettered the media, and appointed women to 50 percent of cabinet positions. In addition to that, Parliament accepted his female nominees for president and head of the Supreme Court.

President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar at the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ACRSS). Photo courtesy of UNMISS via Flickr Commons.

The signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ACRSS) on September 12, 2018, has led to relative peace in South Sudan. Mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—a regional economic and security bloc—South Sudanese policymakers recently extended the ‘pre-transitional’ period until November 2019 before forming the transitional government of national unity. Given the few months remaining before this new deadline, there are serious concerns that many key tasks remain to be addressed: namely, the issue of the number and boundaries of provinces/states, violent conflicts, a single national army, and securing the funding necessary for implementing the peace agreement. These cumulative factors hamper the peace process, foreshadowing future outbreaks of violence.

Burundi peacekeepers prepare for their next rotation to Somalia. Photo courtesy of US Army Africa via Flickr Commons.

On April 3, 2019, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg visited Washington, D.C. to plead his case. Mr. Stoltenberg insisted on the continued importance of his organization to the collective security of European and North American states. Under pressure from forces on both sides of the Atlantic that claim the alliance to be obsolete, Mr. Stoltenberg stood before Congress and declared that “it is good [for America] to have friends” like those in NATO. To bolster his case, he also cited increased defense spending by member states to the tune of $41 billion—a clear gesture of goodwill and reassurance to U.S. President Donald Trump, who has lambasted NATO allies that do not meet the defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP and has openly questioned the value of the alliance. Since Mr. Trump’s election in 2016, NATO has come under increased scrutiny from many in the United States, threatening the near-universal support enjoyed by the alliance since its creation in 1949. 

Participants from the G5 Sahel Investment Conference in September 2018, a joint conference by the International Republican Institute, the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat, and regional youth leaders which aimed to publicize economic investment opportunities for young people in the Sahel. Photo courtesy of the International Republican Institute. 

In December 2018, leaders of the G5 Sahel Joint Force Member States—Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger—and international donors gathered for a coordination conference in Nouakchott, Mauritania to orchestrate funding for the Joint Force’s Priority Investment Program (PIP) aimed at addressing the Sahel region’s chronic violence and fragility. The G5’s PIP reflects the strategic intention to operationalize the Joint Force as an instrument both of security and development—a strategy that would adequately address the complex socio-economic, political, and climate change challenges driving instability across the region.

The Atlantic Ocean along a shoreline in Ifni, Morrocco. Picture courtesy of mbohl via Flickr Commons. 

African peace and security challenges in relation to the continent’s wider maritime scope and its interplay with external political actors receive little attention. Yet, much of the internal politics that affect peacebuilding in Africa involve interregional actors, such as Europe and the Mideast. This lack of attention is not seen in the South Atlantic where the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), operates as a multilateral platform between some African and South American nations. The ZPCSA’s goal is preserving regional peace and a nuclear-free-zone in regions where documented illegal trafficking flows link South America, West Africa, and Europe, and security challenges plague the Gulf of Guinea, a transport nexus in the Afro-Atlantic oil trade.

Maputo, Mozambique. Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons. 

One year ago today, Mozambique experienced an attack by Islamist extremists, the first of its kind, when as many as 30 men stormed several police stations in the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado. An ominously familiar pattern has set in since. Incidents have increased, becoming more widespread and brutal with time. In the last twelve months, several dozen attacks have targeted civilians as well as state actors across the North. The violence has forced thousands of Mozambicans to flee, after homes and villages have been burned to the ground, and hundreds have been injured or killed, including adults and children beheaded by machete. Some government reactions have been heavy-handed, with the president promising a “firm and ruthless” campaign against terrorism, police have arrested hundreds, and this week trials began for 180 individuals held in association with the attacks. The military bombed by air and sea a village suspected of harboring terrorists, killing some 50 citizens, and abuse by security personnel sent North to stop the attacks is reportedly widespread. The experts, meanwhile, have warned against repression and advocated for ‘soft measures,’ to little discernable effect. The sum total is discouraging. One observer recently compared Northern Mozambique to Northeastern Nigeria at the beginning of the Boko Haram uprising.

Former President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, speaks at the United Nations General Assembly. (Photo via Flickr Commons)

Introduction: The Launch of a Campaign

On May 16, 2018, a group of Ghanaian civil society organizations (CSOs)[i] launched a campaign requesting the Government of Ghana to seek the extradition of Yahya Jammeh, the former president of The Gambia, to face justice in Ghana for the 2005 massacre of 44 Ghanaian migrants in The Gambia. The campaign, “Jammeh2JusticeGhana,” has the primary objective of persuading the Government of Ghana to extradite Yahya Jammeh’s from Equatorial Guinea in order to prosecute him in Ghana. This campaign is a part of a larger effort to seek accountability for Jammeh’s alleged crimes and human rights violations. The launch of this campaign, hosted by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), follows a wider campaign effort by The Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations and other local and international human rights organizations[ii] to ensure that Jammeh and members of his regime are brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Orange democratic movement supporters in Kenya. Photo courtesy of DEMOSH via Flickr Commons. 

Politics is indeed a tricky affair judging from the recent “Golden Handshake” between political giants and arch-rivals, with Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga marking the end of the prolonged electoral crisis in the country. The newfound friendship has rebounded the stock exchange, revamped tourism, and excited foreign investors who are now optimistic of rainy days ahead.[1]  However, will the gesture provide an impetus for the much-needed constitutional democracy, and guarantee civil rights and liberties in a way that will lead Kenyans to Canaan?[2]

Police forces present on the streets of Nairobi during election violence. Photo courtesy of DEMOSH via Flickr Commons.

Election-related violence has been a growing trend in African countries since the wave of democracy that swept across the continent in 1990s. The 1992 election in Angola led to a 10-year civil war in the country that resulted in thousands of deaths. Following the 2005 election in Ethiopia, election-related violence led to about 200 deaths. In Kenya, the 2007/2008 election left about 1500 people dead. The 2010 presidential election in Ivory Coast recorded about 3000 deaths. Following the commencement of the fourth republic, after a protracted military rule in Nigeria, most of the elections held in the country have been characterized by violence, and thousands of people have died in election-related violence. The Human Rights Watch recorded that more than 800 people died during the 2011 election violence in Nigeria. Similar trends have been recorded in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Gambia, Rwanda, Ghana, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in others, where thousands of people have been killed and properties damaged following election violence. This trend is a threat to the survival of democracy and human security on the continent, and there is an urgent need to address it.

A news control room. Photo courtesy of Ross G. Strachan via Flickr Commons. 

For decades, the mass media has shaped the world’s view of what is important in our daily lives—our social and political realities—through its ability to influence information and how it is presented.[1] As such, the media has been, and still is, a powerful tool in shaping our perceptions of what matters in our world today. If used well, this inherent power of the media can be of great value in the prioritization of the demographic dividend framework in Africa’s policymaking processes. The media has the power to raise the profile of the demographic dividend agenda in Africa’s development conversations and sustain policymakers’ attention. At any given time, policymakers have several competing policy priorities that may be influenced by their personal interests, opinions, and worldview,[2] not to mention the complex nature of the policymaking process that involves many moving pieces.[3] Media coverage of issues relating to the demographic dividend is critical now more than ever. Despite high-level conversations on the demographic dividend over the past five years, including the 2017 African Union Summit where African leaders committed to investing in the large youthful population to steer development,[4] there is still worry that the demographic dividend ‘hype’ may die out if these conversations do not translate into action at the policymaking level.