Africa Up Close

This blog was originally posted on NewSecurityBeat, a blog of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center.

Secretary of State Blinken is right to focus on climate change and democracy during his first trip to sub-Saharan Africa. At the top of his and everyone else’s mind should be the question: will democratic backsliding in countries like Benin make it more difficult to deal with the effects of climate change? Even more worrisome: will it worsen conflict hotspots, such as the West African Sahel, where climate change is playing a role? All eyes should be on coastal West Africa as countries such as Benin deal with violent insecurity and climate pressure creeping down from the Sahel. My ongoing research in Benin suggests that the country’s democratic local institutions, despite all their faults, are the country’s best defense against the breakdown in rural governance that has befallen Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso. 

In 2023, Zimbabweans will head to the polls to vote in the general election for the president and both houses of parliament. Many civil society organizations within Zimbabwe fear that the relative peace achieved following the 2018 election is no longer attainable. There is no indication of any changes coming from President Mnangagwa or the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). So the onus to promote peace falls, somewhat, on regional actors who have historically turned a blind eye to issues within Zimbabwe. Stability in Zimbabwe is no longer a Zimbabwe issue. As insurgencies in Mozambique begin to threaten the region, an unstable Zimbabwe further weakens the security of the neighboring Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. To maintain stability, support democratization, and mitigate electoral violence, key regional actors, specifically South Africa and other SADC countries, have to take a stronger stance on Zimbabwe.

My take is that U.S. President Joe Biden has hit the ground running. Still, this brief note comes bearing a modest suggestion for an even greater effort. Specifically, the world’s dangerous coronavirus pandemic offers President Biden a golden opportunity to rally and lead a worldwide initiative to bring the COVID-19 virus to its knees, globally and swiftly. Undoubtedly, this would be a difficult mission—complex, multi-faceted, multi-step, and of significant duration.

Anti-Blackness is not uniquely American, yet the solution to racism in the United States cannot neatly be transferred to countries in which white supremacy is not the root cause of their own anti-Blackness. This is not to say that white supremacy doesn’t have its tentacles around the whole world, but in most Western countries, the issue is white vs. Black. In other countries, beyond the focus of much dialogue, it’s Black vs. Blacker. Sudan, in particular, is a country in which everyone is Black in appearance, yet the racism many in the region face stems from a complicated history of Arab superiority, which I explored in detail in my last blog. Therefore, understanding how to combat racism in Sudan requires a re-examination of the way anti-Blackness is framed when it is discussed in the country.

Growing up as a Black man in the United States, I am all too familiar with how racism shows up in our society today. From slavery and Jim Crow laws of the past to police brutality and mass incarceration in the present, American racism is well documented. However, a fact that tends to be overlooked is that anti-Blackness is a global phenomenon, present in many countries. One such country is Sudan. Though I’ve grown up in the United States, my family always made sure I was in touch with my relatives overseas, and I’ve grown to love the country my parents were born in. However, as I grew older and participated in discussions with other Sudanese, I began to recognize that Sudan has its own battles when it comes to prejudices, showing up in the form of mass internalized anti-Blackness. Inspired by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement happening around me in the United States, I decided to explore the issues of colorism that have developed in Sudan over many generations.

This blog was originally posted on NewSecurityBeat, a blog of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center.

When Mwanahamisi Abdallah’s mother announced plans to marry her off to a stranger, the 14-year-old Tanzanian girl burst into tears. She had no desire to marry—especially after learning the man already had three wives. Remembering advice from a teacher, she phoned authorities to intervene. They blocked the wedding and eventually delivered Mwanahamisi from her village in southeastern Lindi region to a girls’ shelter in Dar es Salaam.

Nigeria is widely, and perhaps rightly, perceived as a conflict-prone country. In recent times, ongoing violent conflicts centered around the Boko Haram insurgency and farmer/herder tensions have dominated peacebuilding conversations. Even more recently, Nigeria has experienced the EndSARS protest and the civil disturbances that have followed. This latest conflict could nonetheless yield important lessons on crisis mismanagement, especially along the trajectory between peace and violence.

Elections in Africa often bring fear and anxiety, and some have resulted in protracted violent conflicts. Elections in 2020 come with additional threats, some beyond the control of the nations involved. The electoral processes in 2020—which will have taken place in a dozen African countries by the end of the year—are being conducted in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, with its attendant economic slowdown. More dangerously, the countries in the Sahel region— Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—and neighboring countries in coastal West Africa—Ghana, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire—are seriously threatened by violent extremism. 2020 is testing the resilience of African governance institutions in the midst of old and emerging threats. On the one hand, nations administering elections are expected to perform beyond the normal to be able to contain the barrage of threats. On the other hand, over-concentration on elections may lead governments to neglect important policy measures, which could, in turn, devastate national economies by, for example, diverting resources needed for security and health.

The ranks of journalists covering conflicts and dangerous assignments in Nigeria may be depleted due to a lack of care from the society and media employers. This trend applies in other African countries and is likely to deprive the continent of necessary information that could enhance peacebuilding and nourish the growth of democracy. In the last three decades, there has been a steady escalation globally in the number of journalists jailed, killed, or maimed while covering local wars and violent civil conflicts—more so than during earlier international conflicts that featured high mortality rates among media correspondents in the Cold War decades. Between 1992-2020, about 1,378 journalists have been killed in different countries across the world, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. In essence, there is a clear shift now from the previous assumption that more journalists tend to be killed while covering foreign wars rather than during national crises. Nowadays, more journalists are falling victim to murder and assassination by criminal gangs, as well as to infection by dangerous disease while reporting on regions affected by Ebola, SARs, and other deadly illnesses. According to global data, in 2019, 64 journalists were missing while 246 were imprisoned. So far in 2020, 26 journalists and media staff worldwide have died in the line of duty.

Ethiopia is battling with the multi-dimensional effects of COVID-19 amidst a fragile political transition that began in March 2018. Like many African states, Ethiopia’s healthcare system is quite poor despite improvements in recent decades. The country was not by any means ready and able to tackle COVID-19 by itself when the pandemic broke out across the world. So far in Ethiopia, more than a thousand people have died of the 65,000-plus who have been infected with the virus. However, without the government’s vigorous diplomatic efforts, the number of active COVID-19 cases in Ethiopia would be far higher. Ethiopia is not the only beneficiary of its COVID diplomacy, which has made a small but significant contribution to the overall fight against the spread of the virus in Africa.