Editorial: When Mali Rises

Élu il y a un an avec une majorité confortable et fort d'une sympathie internationale sans précédent, le président Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta avait toutes les cartes en main pour résoudre la crise au Nord et conduire le Mali hors du gouffre où l'avaient plongé la rébellion déclenchée par le MNLA, le coup d'État du capitaine Sanogo et l'occupation jihadiste. Douze mois plus tard, ces cartes ont été perdues les unes après les autres.

President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of Mali was elected by a large popular majority and enjoyed strong backing by the international community that was without precedent right after he came to power.  After being elected he had all the trump cards he needed to resolve the crisis in the North and to help Mali rise out of the ditch that the MNLA rebellion, Captain Sanogo coup, and jihadist occupation had plunged the country into.  Twelve months later, President Keita has managed to forfeit his advantages, one after the other.

This article was originally translated from French.  Click here to read more from Jeune Afrique.

If the President had called for and engaged in an inter-Malian dialogue during the delay proscribed by the Ouagadougou Accord (lasting up to sixty days after the formation of a government) he would have given himself the means to negotiate in far more favorable conditions.

However since the Malian army was defeated at Kidal on the 21st of May, the balance of power in the country has swayed against the President.  The Malian state's international credibility has also declined substantially.  The groups in the North have taken advantage of this situation, and now seem to want refute the limits imposed upon them (insisting that they respect the territorial integrity, national unity and secularity of state) at Ouagadougou in June of 2013.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to formulate an appropriate democratic response to the questions raised by the separatist groups in the North.

The crisis that runs through Mali is a deep one.  It is not limited to a single question about the North, but poses governance questions that affect all the entire country.  The responses to the crisis in the North must therefore be framed within the context of all of Mali.

We must not forget that Mali crumbled in the face of rebellion, because of the presence of AQIM in Timetrine region and the Wagadou forests, and because of a thriving drug and hostage trade.  But Mali also fell because of rampant corruption, because of a cult of personality surrounding those who dictate power and justice, and because of lack of vitality and autonomy among the country's political parties, civil society and democratic institutions.

Mali must thus be therapized holistically.  From this perspective, the negotiations in Algiers and the desired outcome of these talks only represent a single step towards Mali's full rehabilitation.

The way that Mali is governed must be boldly revised.  The hurdles and the difficulties that have peppered the first year of IBK's quinquennium demonstrate that a simple return to constitutional normalcy will not suffice in healing the country's wounds.

Mali has not become a "normal" country again just because presidential elections were held in July and August of 2013. Important institutional reforms must occur so that Mali can respond not just to the demands of the Northern groups, but also so that it can install and consolidate measures around good governance so that relations between the state, citizen, and various communities can be effectively reorganized.

Mali should propose a national peace and good governance pact to the Northern groups and to other forces.  This pact must be underpinned by a strong willingness to ring in a new era filled with trust and cohesion between all of Mali's various actors.

In this regard, the regional governor elections (that will take place all over the country) can be a relevant response to the concerns surrounding democratic governance expressed by the populace.

Furthermore, in order to fight against monarchical governance and cults of personality in power, Mali must also move from a presidential to a parliamentary system.  This reform would effectively regulate power between the executive and legislative branches of government, while allowing the state to save tens of billions of francs devoted to scrutinizing presidential election results.  The job of Prime Minister would also disappear, and parties will be encouraged to come together and regroup themselves into more viable political entities.

The reestablishment of the army, the reformation of justice, the rehabilitation of public administration, of control and accountability, of training and employment policy, of the consolidation of the press, of the emergence and reinforcement of a civic conscious, will all be at the heart of this new pact.  Let us now dare to lay the groundwork for a new Mali that will take giant strides forward once it rises.

This article was translated by Matthew LaLime, Staff Intern with the Africa Program at the Wilson Center. 

Photo courtesy of European Parliament via Flickr Commons