Military Integration After Civil Wars: Any lessons for Somalia?

An interesting new book offers considerable food for thought about the ongoing efforts to build an effective set of Somali security services. Roy Licklider's edited volume, New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars provides a useful overview of current knowledge on this important topic based on several macro-level analyses and eleven national case studies (Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Rwanda, Philippines, South Africa, DR Congo, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and Burundi).

Military integration after civil wars has become what Licklider calls "the new normal" (p.1). He defines integration as the process whereby "individuals are brought into the new military in positions similar to the ones they occupied in prior organizations" (p.3). Military integration has become popular because it is often thought to help solve three problems: 1) how to reduce the likelihood that the civil war will reignite; 2) how to reduce the overall number of soldiers in the country; and 3) how to forge a national identity between communities previously torn apart by war.

Licklider's volume suggests that the success of military integration efforts hinge on three sets of factors. First, is the new military efficient? Can the new military perform tasks? Can it remain integrated in peacetime and not kill its own members in large numbers? Can it perform well compared to other militaries against both foreign and domestic opponents, especially those from groups represented in the military? Second, is the new military under civilian control? Is it subject to civilian control on budget and personnel issues, and when ordered into use against foreign adversaries and domestic opponents from groups represented in the military?

And, third, does the new military reduce the likelihood of civil war reoccurring?

Licklider sets out a menu of five potential causal pathways by which military integration could help reduce the risk of renewed war, lower the number of soldiers, and forge a shared national identity. The first is what academics call "costly commitment," namely, when military integration demonstrates that each side is seriously committed to peace. Second, military integration can help when the new force has the ability to provide security in the post-war society and will do so for all sides. A third pathway is for the new military to offer employment to individuals who might otherwise be available for renewed civil war. The fourth route is symbolic, specifically whether the new military acts as a symbol of national unity for the entire society, regardless of its efficiency. Finally, the process of military integration might strengthen trust among elites on different sides that facilitates progress between them in other sectors.

The book's eleven country case studies provide no real evidence for the "costly commitment" logic. The same goes for the arguments about trust-building and providing security by employing potential belligerents which found little support (the exceptions being in Mozambique and the Philippines respectively). In contrast, several case studies noted the important benefits that can accrue when the new militaries can provide security for all groups, and especially the symbolic importance of a new army for the country's efforts to forge a shared national identity. Indeed, the symbolic importance of military integration was the most regularly endorsed pathway in the eleven country case studies.

On the basis of this evidence, Licklider concluded that military integration is possible; the military capabilities of the new forces are "often irrelevant to their successes" (p.259); international assistance is often helpful but not necessary for success (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda); human rights violators were often not excluded from new armies; and quotas were often used and were generally quite successful.

For the would-be external architects of military integration, Licklider offered two further notes of caution: ensure that the new army is appropriate for the country in terms of composition, size and sustainability, and guard against the potential negative effects that a strong army can have on political democracy in a country emerging from protracted warfare. Given the potential to build inappropriate new armies that might stifle political democracy, Licklider warned that it remains unclear that it's a good idea to strengthen the military in post-civil war states. Part of the appeal of military integration, however, stems from the fact that despite all the challenges it is much easier for outsiders to build new armies than to reform a local police force or the judiciary.

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What implications does this new research hold for ongoing efforts to build Somalia's security forces in general and the Somali National Army (SNA) in particular?

First, we should recall that the war in Somalia is far from over. Consequently, efforts to build the SNA have taken place during war, not after it, and in the absence of a political settlement. In this basic sense, the process of building the SNA is therefore not directly related to a negotiation process because most al-Shabaab fighters are considered beyond the pale. However, this factor could become increasingly relevant when considering the relationship between the central government and the various regional entities.

As a result, and second, any military integration process in Somalia will take place within a contested state. Specifically, it will occur in a context where a variety of actors and entities continue to compete for recognition and status. Among the main players are the central Government, regional entities (including Somaliland, Puntland, the Jubaland Interim Administration, Himan and Habeeb, and Southwest state) and other militias such as those associated with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'ah. Of these, it is Somaliland that poses the most fundamental challenge because it refuses to recognize the Central Government's authority. In contrast, the other regional entities are merely contesting the appropriate balance of power between themselves and the Central Government.

Such local competition has meant that the project to build a national army in Somalia has only been possible because of external support, principally from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its troop-contributing countries and other external donors including the European Union, US, UK, and Turkey.

A fourth point is that it remains distinctly unclear whether any al-Shabaab fighters will be integrated into the national army. While the Somali Government has regularly suggested it would offer amnesty to some al-Shabaab fighters in order to encourage defections, this is not the same thing as accepting the need for military integration involving its most deadly enemy.

All these factors suggest that Somalia remains a difficult case – conceptually and practically – that does not fit the mold of most recent experiments in military integration. Nevertheless, some of the insights from Licklider's volume do seem to be relevant.

First, it is important not to underestimate the symbolic effects of building a national army when trying to forge national unity. Of course, this can only work if the fledgling SNA is seen as representing all of Somalia rather than just specific groups within it, and here, some of the initial evidence is not encouraging. But on the other hand, the establishment of the Danab ("lightning") companies recruited on a competitive basis from a multi-clan base holds considerable promise.

Second, ensuring that the new military is subject to genuine civilian control is more important than strengthening its coercive capabilities. This is crucial not only to guard against the risk of coups but also to ensure that senior military officers do not develop major stakes in (licit or illicit) business and be tempted to use elements of the national army to support their commercial interests.

Third, evidence from other countries suggests that external actors should avoid using the SNA as a way of employing misfits and former fighters in order to bolster stability. This is likely to prove counter-productive if tried. Given the number of Somalis who could reasonably make a claim to be considered "combatants," this would be a recipe for constructing a hugely bloated and unprofessional force along the lines of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

Fourth, the SNA that is built must be appropriate and sustainable for Somalia long after the monies from external donors dry up. This will mean balancing the current threats posed by al-Shabaab against the longer-term needs of the country. The latter of which revolve around striking the right balance between the Army, police, and intelligence forces in the new security apparatus.

So far, of all the country case studies in Licklider's book, events in Somalia seem to most closely resemble those in the DR Congo where competing elites would only accept a settlement involving a weak central government, and as a result deliberately sabotaged the integration process. The fact that such obstacles have not been overcome despite more than a decade of trying, the presence of a large peace enforcement operation, and multiple external donors, illustrate some of the problems also facing Somalia. It also highlights the importance of Ronald Krebs' insight in the book that "Military integration is, first and foremost, a local political problem, not a matter of technical expertise that local actors lack and whose secrets international actors must therefore impart" (p.255). As a consequence, the architects of military integration in Somalia must be careful to ensure that it does not become a substitute for the more important effort to generate political reconciliation and national unity.

Paul D. Williams is associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.

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