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Political Finance in Democratic Nigeria: The Role of Article 10 of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

Benjamin Adeniran Aluko
Former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki is being prosecuted for his involvement in a corrupt arms deal. Photo by Chatham House, via Flickr. Creative Commons.

[caption id="attachment_11566" align="aligncenter" width="600"] Former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki, the alleged architect of the $2 billion arms deal theft. Photo by Chatham House, via Flickr. Creative Commons.[/caption]

On July 11, 2003, the Assembly of the African Union, of which Nigeria is a member, adopted the "African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption." The convention was interpreted as a serious commitment on the part of the leadership of the African states to fight corruption, and received global commendation. One commentator opined that the adoption of the anti-corruption convention "marked an event of great importance regionally and nationally in the fight against corruption."1

It must, however, be noted that the AU's 28-article convention was its response to the international anti-corruption regime spearheaded by the United States with the promulgation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. That effort later received global approval on December 4, 2000, when the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/61 recognized the desirability of an effective international legal instrument against corruption.

The AU convention obliges state parties to, among other objectives, "promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors." Broadly speaking, it seeks to promote and institutionalize transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. Consequently, the document addresses critical actors such as political parties, the media, civil society organizations, the judiciary, and legislative bodies.

Article 10 of the AU Convention dwells on the very critical issue of funding political parties, which are critical players in modern democracies. The first portion of the article states that "Each State Party shall adopt legislative and other measures to: Proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties."

This provision was put in place not only because of fears of politicians deploying state resources to finance political activities but in response to a very real problem that had become endemic in many parts of the continent. In Nigeria, for instance, in both the First and the Second Republics, politicians were indicted for stealing state funds to finance their political parties and campaigns. For example, following the military take-over of the Sheu Shagari civilian administration on December 31, 1983, the then-civilian governors of Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo States were prosecuted and jailed for collecting 2.1 million Naira from a construction company to finance their political party, the Unity Party of Nigeria.

The Legal Framework

The key question, then, is whether the involvement of the Nigerian State in the convention has had the desired outcome: reforming the financing of political parties and campaigns in Nigeria.

Nigeria has put in place a number of legislative and other mechanisms to ensure the realization of corruption-free political financing. For instance, Olusegun Obasanjo's from 1999 to 2007 established two anti-corruption bodies: the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The two bodies, though invested with slightly different powers, were set up to investigate corrupt practices including the illegal diversion of state resources to fund political activities in both the public and private sectors and prosecute persons suspected to have engaged in them. The nation's constitution, which came into force in 1999, and the Electoral Act of 2006 (re-enacted with modifications by the Electoral Act of 2010) criminalize the illegal use of state resources to fund political parties and campaigns.2

Despite these mechanisms, the reality today is that proceeds of corruption are still being used to fund political parties and campaigns. It was recently discovered that $2.1 billion intended for the purchase of arms to fight Boko Haram was diverted to the then-ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). Some part of this money was allegedly used to finance the political campaigns of some of its members, including President Goodluck Jonathan's unsuccessful reelection bid and the 2014 election of Governor Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State. In fact, Musiliu Obanikoro, a former defense minister in the Jonathan administration, confessed to the EFCC that he gave more than a billion Naira to Ayo Fayose to secure his election as Governor of Ekiti State, taken from funds meant to purchase arms to fight Boko Haram. Similarly, Esther Nenadi Usman, a former finance minister in the Jonathan administration who was also the Director of Finance for Jonathan's campaign organization, revealed how she distributed about 1.85 billion Naira to PDP party chieftains for election purposes. The litany of confessions and accusations suggests that the link between corruption and party financing remains strong.

Fighting Political Finance Corruption

The obvious lessons are that 1) the laws are there, as demanded by Article 10, and 2) the relevant institutions exist but they lack both the capacity and the requisite political will to perform effectively. Thus, it becomes imperative that state institutions be strengthened.

It's also clear that fighting corruption in Nigeria requires more than commitment on the part of the political leadership. During Olusegun Obasanjo's presidency, the pioneer chairman of the EFCC, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu demonstrated unusual commitment and determination in the fight against corruption. During Ribadu's strict tenure, the-then Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, who was Ribadu's boss (Ribadu was at the time a serving police officer seconded to head the EFCC), was investigated, prosecuted, and jailed for corrupt practices.

But after the forced exit of Nuhu Ribadu and the appointment of a new head for the EFCC, the organization simply went into coma. Farida Wasiri, the successor of Nuhu Ribadu, was allegedly a nominee of a former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, who was at the time being prosecuted by the EFCC. Predictably, the former governor was discharged and acquitted of all the charges against him, though he was later jailed in the UK for money laundering.

The AU convention's Article 10 lays out laudable goals, and the institutions and laws to enforce them in Nigeria exist, on paper. The reality, however, is that corrupt political financing will continue in Nigeria as long as the state institutions that enforce the laws against political finance corruption are weak and dysfunctional.

Benjamin Adeniran Aluko, Ph.D, is a Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar at the Wilson Center from October to December 2016. He is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and an affiliate of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a member organization of the Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding.

1: Cited in Kolawole Olaniyan, "The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: A Critical Appraisal," African Human Rights Law Journal, 2004: 74-75.

2: Ben Nwabueze, The National Question and Corruption (Ibadan, Nigeria: John Publishers Ltd., 2016): 207.

About the Author

Benjamin Adeniran Aluko

Benjamin Adeniran Aluko

Former Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar;
Research Fellow, Ibadan University

Africa Program

The Africa Program works to address the most critical issues facing Africa and US-Africa relations, build mutually beneficial US-Africa relations, and enhance knowledge and understanding about Africa in the United States. The Program achieves its mission through in-depth research and analyses, public discussion, working groups, and briefings that bring together policymakers, practitioners, and subject matter experts to analyze and offer practical options for tackling key challenges in Africa and in US-Africa relations.    Read more