Africa Up Close

Fig. A: Independent research by Pearl Matibe, Research Scholar. Source: US Department of State

How and why do we see more diplomatic engagement between Africa and the United States since the Russia-Ukraine war?

In comparison to the analysis of the 2017-2022 US Department of State’s Public Schedules to 2022’s first six months, travel to Africa tripled for secretaries of state, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries. In 2017, under Secretary Rex Tillerson, it was over four-times lower, whereas, under Secretary Michael Pompeo in 2018, data indicates increased activity. Compared to prior years, travel to African countries increased threefold, from 6 percent to just under 18 percent after the war started under Secretary Antony Blinken.

In international relations, examining high-level visits reveals factors about diplomacy practices and identifies foreign policy priorities. For sustained relations on common interests “establishing bonds” changes “perceived misalignment.” Since 1909, only eight US presidents made African trips. Notably, President Barack Obama addressed the African Union (AU). Seven years later, President Joseph Biden delivered pre-recorded video remarks. Furthermore, Ghanian, Tanzanian, and Zambian presidents visited Washington, while Kenya’s met Trump and Biden. This indicates progress, including the Senate vote on six new ambassadors to Africa.

Why it matters

Blinken in Africa seeks forging strengthened partnerships evidenced by Biden’s Fiscal Year 2022 $7.43 billion budget request for Africa. His virtual April 2021 and in-person November 2021 and August 2022 tours signal efforts to reinforce political ties. Namely, Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman’s May 2022 motivation for travel was to deepen partnerships, further peace and security, and underscore embassies’ daily “collection of diplomatic work.”

Perpetuating relationship-building engagements and “regular consultation” are crucial, because Africa is emerging from multiple crises including severe drought, COVID-19 impacts, and food insecurity. Blinken recognizes that by 2050 Africa’s people will be a quarter of the global population. The war is magnifying Africa’s prosperity at risk.  Additionally, US lawmakers feel that Africa is increasingly crucial beyond development aid. Similarly, Blinken and Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, confirm African states are major geopolitical players, signifying clear, long-prepared intention.

Drivers

Challenges to strengthening US-Africa relations included Trump’s disdainful rhetoric and not visiting as president. However, Blinken acknowledged “The United States knows that, on most of the urgent challenges and opportunities we face, Africa will make the difference” suggesting genuine intent to rebuild bridges.

Permanent partnerships are indispensable. In 2022, the UN General Assembly’s March 2^nd vote to rebuke aggression against Ukraine resulted in 141 votes in favor—73 percent of member countries—5 against, and 48.6 percent of the abstentions were African. The AU has a foundational agreement to maintain a collective front in “relations with the world,” making the divided African vote all-important on differences in individual states’ interests. Africa’s wheat dependence on, and growing security cooperation with, Russia indicate the relationship’s value to African states and their affirmative voting. Other reasons include perceptions of “vaccine hoarding” leaving Africa behind. In the April 7 vote to suspend Russia’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council, 10 African countries voted yes—9 voted no. The 28 percent total African representation in the UN General Assembly is a salient fact in US-Africa relations.

Subsequently, Phee explained why she wanted to speak to African journalists on the war’s impact on Africa because “African voices matter.” Moreover, Blinken spoke with Senegalese President and AU Chairperson, Macky Sall, on the “importance of supporting Ukraine against Russia.”

Diplomatic pressure cited by Senegal and South Africa suggests government officials sought to encourage African countries to rebuke Russia. One day after, South Africa’s April abstention from impeding Russia’s UNHRC membership, Blinken’s counterpart, Dr. Naledi Pandor, described “tectonic shifts” in power dynamics originating with the Russia-Ukraine war, citing UNGA votes. Biden spoke with South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, emphasizing the need for “a clear, unified international response.” Pandor defended South Africa’s position as not “indifferent” but preferring dialogue. To critics, she was “strenuously pointing” out that South Africa faced “deliberate opposition to our call for peace and negotiations,” but  clarified later pressure did not come from Blinken.

By June 17, Blinken and Senegalese Foreign Minister, Aïssata Tall Sall, discussed the devastating impact of the war on food security in Africa. The day after, Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, met Foreign Minister of Senegal Aïssata Tall Sall, and he pledged “to tackle shared global challenges,” indicative of Africa’s evolving role in international politics.

Optimizing engagement has geostrategic outcomes. Ramaphosa confirms South Africa being “approached to play a mediation role.” In contrast, the US-Kenya stance on Ukraine is aligned, evidenced under the Inaugural US-Kenya Bilateral Strategic Dialogue and vouched to work closely at the UN as Kenya is considered a US “strategic partner”. Concurrently, some African leaders in Cameroon, Mozambique, and Mali are forging stronger ties with America’s strategic competitors like Russia, and Zimbabwe signing new agreements.

Policy

Africa’s split-UN-vote is indicative of continental ambivalence, despite the AU’s collective-front agreement. Experts Joseph Siegle and Jeffrey Smith, argue overcoming these hurdles requires more African participation and rejection of Russia. Against this backdrop, the “weight of American diplomatic presence” and Africans shaping outcomes, beyond presidential election cycles are essential.

The White House announced convening a second US-Africa Leaders’ Summit. Senate Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID) lauded this effort and Senate Resolution 538, whose rationale advances strengthening relations to “build on areas of mutual interest,” embodies congressional support. The first Summit was “partnership predicated.” A RAND report supports more robust, US diplomatic engagement with Africa as Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) has said, the United States “must rebuild its credibility,” and effective alliances. Moreover, White House Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa, Dana Banks confirmed before the war, the Biden-Harris Administration’s “decisive action” to re-imagine, reinvigorate, and revive US-Africa engagement.

Recommendations

Recent top-level US official visits should be applauded as worthwhile milestones, including Blinken’s travels, signaling “America is back.” Governments should continue scaled-up high-profile engagements—including presidents as chief diplomats to anchor US-Africa ties for decades while maximizing ambassadorial engagements. This helps show that continental and regional leaders as well as national governments can preserve common interests as the war persists. A reflected example was stemmed from the Biden-Ramaphosa US-South Africa Bilateral on September 16 that was noted to have “reaffirmed the value of our longstanding partnership, and underscored South Africa’s influential voice in global affairs.”

Few issues have strained US-Africa ties more than mutual perception. Foreign ministries alone are no longer the sole gatekeepers of advancing state image, making concrete actions and coherent innovation in two-way understanding through mass media necessary. An increasingly interconnected world provides opportunities for Africa and America to improve domestically to enhance positive, public knowledge helping their citizens’ attitudes towards each other and resist negative sentiments.

Lastly, advancing positive narratives can optimize confidence, credibility, and how both populations think about each other as the war progresses. As Sherman explained, countries’ interests can differ.

Conclusion

Anecdotal evidence, data, and observable US-Africa foreign policy behavior underscores difficulties in US-Africa policy in the context of the war. If a country feels insecure, it acts to make itself more secure, and at the UN General Assembly, some African countries continue to seek security. For Africa and America, advancing common interests, requires creative leveraging of their interdependence and “very active engagement.”

Pearl Matibe is a research scholar on foreign policy and international security at George Mason University, and a correspondent, and media commentator on PowerFM98.7. You may follow her on Twitter: @PearlMatibe

The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of the Wilson Center or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Wilson Center’s Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.