Africa Up Close

Compared to the recent history of terrorism in Nigeria’s Northern region, the Southwest, South-South, and Southeast regions have been relatively peaceful. However, on June 5, 2022, an attack which claimed more than 40 lives and injured 56 congregants was carried out during a Pentecostal service at the St. Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Southwest Nigeria. This recent mass killing, demonstrated the expanding geography of terror into southern Nigeria and the contagious nature of terrorism in a formerly peaceful region.

Throughout the Sahel region and especially in Sahelian capitals, anti-French voices are growing louder. Local protest movements are criticizing France’s policies in the Sahel and criticizing the dependence of past or present Sahelian leaders on France. Movements such as the M5-RFP in Mali, COPA/BF in Burkina Faso, Tournons La Page in Niger, and Wakit Tama in Chad have all had anti-French messages as part of their wider political platforms. Some anti-French sentiment can be linked to Russian disinformation. Yet many ordinary citizens in the Sahel, as well as many serious politicians and intellectuals in the region, have powerful criticisms of France. Listening to their criticisms reveals the depth of Sahelians’ frustrations with endemic insecurity (which France did not cause, but which France has not reversed) and with politicians perceived as too deferential to France.

Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, a new global disaster is threatening to plunge Africa into increased risk of famine and deprivation. Ukraine and Russia are among the world’s foremost breadbaskets. Together, they provide around 30 percent of the world’s wheat and barley, one fifth of its maize, and over half of its sunflower oil. Ukraine is the largest exporter of sunflower oil, the fourth largest exporter of maize (corn), and the fifth largest exporter of wheat. UN Assistant Secretary-General Amin Awad said, “This war will have no winner. Rather, we have witnessed for 100 days what is lost: lives, homes, jobs and prospects.” The war has worsened a food security crisis that is already burgeoning in many countries. High commodity prices and supply chain disruptions are hitting the global community hard. The UN has also consistently stressed the threats of famine that vulnerable states around the world including Africa face as a result of the war.

Ghana is an example of a reliable ally in an often-volatile region. First recognized by the United States for its democratic tendencies during President Bill Clinton’s tenure, Ghana has consistently made progress towards socioeconomic outcomes desired by successive U.S. administrations.[i] Embodied in President Nana Addo Akufo-Addo’s “Ghana Beyond Aid” (GBA) vision, Ghana has demonstrated growth from its status as a recipient of U.S. foreign assistance to that of a steady U.S. partner in security, trade, and the promotion of democratic values.[ii] In this spirit, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Ghana (GoG) co-developed the objectives of 1) accelerating and sustaining broad-based economic growth in Ghana, 2) increasing the accountability of quality service delivering the country, and 3) accelerating sustainable development in Northern Ghana.

With presidential and legislative elections coming up for August 9, Kenyan politicians and ordinary citizens are bracing for what is already a contentious election season. As dynastic-heir President Uhuru Kenyatta steps down and his former ally William Ruto and former enemy Raila Odinga now compete against each other, the 2022 elections offer a renewed challenge and opportunity for Kenya’s security and democracy. This short memo proposes to the Kenyan police service two concrete initiatives to implement alone or in concert to reduce the risk of election violence. In particular, 1) better policing and 2) protection of campaign rallies and members of the judiciary are important steps that can be taken to shore up this country’s valuable but strained national elections.

The digital revolution has ushered in an era with significant implications for the skill sets required in the modern workplace. Consequently, higher education institutions across the African continent face the challenge of increasing capacity and relevance to accommodate increasing demands for training suited for the digital economy. In areas where expanding higher education access is hindered by physical infrastructure and trained faculty limitations, online instruction has the potential to increase capacity. A UNESCO report highlights that technology in education bridges capacity gaps and builds 21st-century skills lessening the digital skills divide between nations.

The study of the relations between African states and the rest of the world tends to focus on the “usual suspects,” meaning global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States. Relations with blocs like the European Union are also studied. Similarly, countries like France and Portugal (given their colonial past) continue to have strong, if controversial, relations with several African nations, while India, and Turkey have in recent years increased their diplomatic and commercial activities. Moreover, other states are looking to create and develop a relationship with African nations and have carried out interesting initiatives in recent years. One example is Kazakhstan.

Local content requirements (LCRs) require companies to fulfill a minimum threshold that incorporates either local labor or locally sourced goods and/or services. Many countries in Africa have turned to LCRs to improve the participation of local contractors, suppliers, and domestic workers in high-tech and large-scale infrastructure projects as well as to provide quantitative targets for domestically manufactured goods or services in the tendering process.

Countries like Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, have used LCRs to leapfrog technological barriers in the extractive sector, compelling foreign oil companies to not only transfer expatriate job positions to locals, but also create linkages with local small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) in the value chain.

It has been four years since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s accession to power. Back then, so much was on Abiy’s plate to address: internally, Ethiopia faced ethnic tensions, constitutional questions, ongoing protests, armed struggle, and human rights abuses, while externally, there were border conflicts with Eritrea and Sudan and international pressure regarding the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), among other challenges. The Premier began his tenure with a unifying swearing-in address to Parliament on April 2, 2018. The famous sentence from that speech, “We Ethiopians, while alive, we are Ethiopians; when we die, we become Ethiopia,” ignited optimism at home and in the diaspora. Consecutive measures taken by Abiy to open up political space, such as releasing political prisoners and journalists, lifting a draconian state of emergency, removing rebel groups from terror lists, and negotiating rapprochement with Eritrea, further strengthened his popular support and built expectations for transformational political and governance reforms.

This blog was originally posted on NewSecurityBeat, a blog of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center.

Hydrogen fuel is becoming a central pillar of global decarbonization strategies. The hype over green hydrogen (the “fuel of the future”) and its potential to provide an abundance of low carbon fuel to transportation and industry has enticed several major emitting countries to scale up its production. And a UN-backed initiative wants to achieve a 50-fold production increase in the next six years.