Africa Up Close

On the evening of March 21st, 2012 I was sharing dinner with a prominent Malian journalist at Comme Chez Soi, a popular French restaurant in Bamako. It was my last meal before catching the midnight flight back to Washington D.C. I had spent the previous month working on a proposal focused on increasing stability and countering violent extremism in northern Mali. During this time, the Taureg-led National Movement for the Liberation of l’Azawad (MNLA), emboldened by highly trained soldiers, arms caches, and heavy artillery from Libya, were overtaking the ill equipped Malian army. Conspiracy theories were mounting, but no one seemed to comprehend the enormity of what was on the horizon. By the time I landed in Washington D.C., President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) had been overthrown, the constitution was suspended, and shortly thereafter, the MNLA unilaterally declared the independence of northern Mali (Aziwad). Islamic extremist groups such as, Ansar al Din and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), quickly capitalized on the political and security vacuum and began imposing Shariah law on the traditionally moderate populations. This raised concerns that northern Mali would become a training, recruitment, and staging ground for terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). When MUJAO threatened to seize major cities in the south and turn Mali into an Islamist state, this fear was heightened triggering rapid military intervention by the French.

Nearly a year later, I was contracted to return to Mali and conduct a ‘resiliency’ assessment focused on ‘youth and livelihoods’. I was excited to return, to see my friends and colleagues, eat brochettes, listen to music, and learn about the new Mali. I had been casually following the news and knew that the situation in the north was dire, but I had no idea how complex, and intractable it was, and to my surprise, that it had always been that way. Despite the warning signs, for the past two decades Mali had been celebrated as a burgeoning democracy. Unfortunately, this was merely a façade. As representatives of civil society suggested, Mali’s underbelly is now exposed and we must decide to either clean out our dirty closet or shove the mess back under the table. Several representatives of civil society believed there is a window of opportunity to begin addressing the issues and building society’s confidence in the prospect of significant change. However, if this moment is not captured, strong forces benefiting from the status quo will quickly fill the void.

This context formed the backdrop of my assessment. As a consultant, it is not unusual to have inadequate time and resources to realistically understand the context. Typically, by the time my contract is complete, I have only begun to discover how much I do not know. Thus, I always leave with more questions then answers. For instance, Mali’s drivers of instability and also its resiliencies are complex, fluid, and overlapping, making the design and implementation of conflict-sensitive interventions difficult. On one hand, weak and corrupt government institutions and illicit markets are considered two of Mali’s greatest barriers to resilience. On the other hand, these very systems serve as socio-political and economic coping mechanisms that have formed over time. They are entrenched and cannot be replaced quickly or easily. If the change process is pushed too fast, undermines existing structures, or adulterates home-grown initiatives, it could easily reinforce the status quo. Alternatively, if the people do not see evidence of change, optimism will fade and unmet expectations will turn into discontent. Due to a lack of obvious alternatives, the temptation to revert back to de-constructive coping mechanisms is strong.

As I departed Mali for the second time, I was overwhelmed with despair. Mali’s challenges are entrenched and connected to a regional dynamic that will not be easy to dismantle. The level of complicity and direct engagement of national and regional government and military actors in illicit activities is unfathomable. Everyone seems to benefit from the instability, drug trade, and ransoms from kidnapping foreigners. My greatest fear is that external actors will fall into the all-too-familiar trap of dumping money into short-term and oversimplified programs that are not aligned with each other or home-grown initiatives. Or that the focus and emphasis of interventions in northern Mali will be on oversimplified military-based counter-terrorism initiatives. As a result, interventions will either have a negative impact or no impact at all . Another quagmire that I am currently struggling to understand is the dangerous dance that the United States and European continues continue to play with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Pakistan. We provide these countries with billions of dollars in aid and oil revenue. In turn, these countries extend enormous resources to promote more extremist forms of Islam in Mali and the Sahel region through direct funding or by providing education to Imams and Koranic teachers. Then, to counter violent extremism, the United States and Europe design and implement relatively small-scale and short-term development programs that have no chance of competing with these larger forces who possess endless resources and longer term visions. Similarly, the drug trade, particularly cocaine trafficking and ransoms, fund both AQIM and rebel groups. Until the United States and Europe can find ways to deter the demand for cocaine, there will be a supply.

In closing, I realize that bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, NGOs, contractors, and foreign militaries are all looking for genuine ways to support Malians in this difficult transition. I also realize that these same actors have their own interests and time frames for Mali and the region. For the sake of Malians, I hope they are able to put the interests of Mali above their own. Time will tell.

By, Peter Bauman is an independent peace building, development, and governance consultant. His email is peterbauman@yahoo.com

Photo credit to Alexandre Baron on Flickr Commons